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Abstract
It is often argued that deregulation of international transactions and its
effects on the “globalization” of financial markets is behind the decline in
the attractiveness of fixed exchange rate regimes. We argue that, instead,
much of the recently observed decrease in the level of capital controls
should be seen as endogenous to the exchange rate regime decision. We
find that the durability of a peg (measured on the basis of the growth of
international reserves), the political benefits of a commitment to a peg,
domestic and foreign inflation (aversion), as well as business cycle
volatility and synchronization are the main determinants of capital controls.
The empirical analysis is based on data for 53 non-OECD countries
covering the period 1980-94.
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Why do so many countries still use capital controls? And what triggered the recent
move to deregulation? The prevalence of capital controls poses a puzzle, because
most economists argue that regulatory restrictions on current account or capital
account transactions impose a welfare loss. Edwards (1999) argues, for instance, that
they introduce major distortions and breed corruption. Furthermore, Klein and Olivei
(1999) and Edwards (2001) report that, after controlling for other variables (including
aggregate investment), countries with a more open capital account have outperformed
countries that have restricted capital mobility in terms of economic growth. Likewise,
Tamirisa (1999) reports that capital controls have a significant negative impact on
trade. Adding to the puzzle is the fact that various authors conclude that capital
controls may not be very effective. In his extensive survey, Dooley (1996) finds no
clear evidence that controls work in the longer run. It generally does not take the
private sector in countries with impediments to capital mobility a long time to get
around the restrictions, e.g. by overinvoicing of imports and underinvoicing of
exports. Dooley reports, however, that capital controls may prolong the life of a fixed
exchange rate regime.
So far, the literature on capital controls has put forward two reasons for the
introduction of capital restrictions (see e.g. Milesi-Ferretti 1998). First, capital
controls might be (mis-) used for fiscal purposes, aiming, for instance, at the retention
of domestic savings for redistribution. Secondly, capital controls might help to impose
limitations on volatile short-term capital flows that are often thought to be responsible
for currency crises and financial sector breakdowns of the Asian type (Edwards
2000a). In fact, deregulation of cross-border financial transactions in many
developing countries and emerging markets has been cited as one of the reasons for
the “vanishing middle ground”, the impossibility of sustaining semi-flexible
adjustable pegs when capital mobility is allowed to increase (Edwards 2000b, Calvo
1999, Eichengreen et al. 1998). For instance, Mussa et al. (2000, p. 13) write that
“...countries that are tightening their links with modern, global financial markets are
increasingly vulnerable to shifts in market sentiments, making the defense of pegged
rates substantially more difficult.” Consequently, the number developing countries
among IMF members with floating exchange rate regimes has increased from about
10% in the mid 1970s to more than 50% in the late 1990s (Mussa et al. 2000). But are
deregulation and exchange rate regime choice really independent? Could it not be the2
decline in the attractiveness of pegging regimes that is behind the decline in
regulation rather than the other way around? This paper extends this second line of
thought by endogenizing the capital control decision.
Based on an extension of the exchange rate regime choice model in Berger,
Jensen and Schjelderup (2000), we argue that a government will not unconditionally
impose capital restrictions to defend a pegged (but adjustable) currency under
pressure.
1 The reason for this is that introducing capital controls has both costs and
benefits. On the benefit side, capital controls might help to secure the advantages of a
fixed exchange rate regime. The benefits of introducing capital controls are the
higher, the less developed the stabilization culture of the country and the more the
country’s business cycle is synchronized with the cycle in the target area of the peg.
There might also be political benefits when governments value the exchange rate
commitment as such. On the cost side of capital controls are the above-mentioned
allocative inefficiencies. In addition, however, there is a credibility loss stemming
from the fact that the introduction of capital controls signals (or confirms) that a fixed
exchange rate is under siege. Faced with the alternatives of immediately letting the
currency float or prolonging the life of a fixed but adjustable exchange rate regime by
introducing capital controls, the government will actually impose capital controls only
when the expected net benefits are positive. This line of reasoning implies a close link
between the exchange rate regime and capital controls: a country will be more ready
to abandon (or not to introduce) capital controls and thus move from an adjustable peg
to a full float if the overall attractiveness of fixed exchange rates is in decline.
In what follows, we will develop this argument formally and test the
predictions of the model, using data for 53 non-OECD countries covering the period
1980-94. We find that much of the observed liberalization of capital flows is due to a
decrease in the attractiveness of fixed exchange rates. A history of public
commitments to fixed exchange rates makes the introduction of capital controls more
likely. Other political economic considerations seem to be less important.
                                                
1 Berger, Sturm and de Haan (2000) test the Berger, Jensen, and Schjelderup (2000) exchange rate
regime choice model for a sample of 65 countries and annual observations from 1980-94. They find
that the model provides a good description of actual regime choices. Edwards (1996) models the
decision between (adjustable) pegs and floating rates. He assumes that a terms-of-trade shock is present
both under fixed and floating rates, but abstracts from domestic shocks. In contrast to the present paper,
Edwards treats capital controls as an exogenous variable in his empirical model of a country's ability to
maintain a peg and thus neglects the simultaneity of the exchange rate regime and capital control
decision.3
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a
simple model to analyze the joint choice of an exchange rate system and capital
controls. Section 3 explains the main empirical model and data employed, while
Section 4 contains a number of robustness checks. The final section offers some
concluding comments.
2. A theoretical model
Consider the following simple model of the decision process. The starting point is an
exchange rate regime characterized by either officially fixed (pegged) exchange rates
or some sort of “dirty” float, i.e. a regime of officially or unofficially managed
exchange rates. According to the consensus view, surveyed by Dooley (1996), under
such an exchange rate regime the main effect of the introduction of capital controls is
an extension of the expected lifetime of such a regime that has come under pressure
on the forex market.
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A government contemplating introducing capital controls during or after the
occurrence of exchange rate pressure will weigh the expected benefits and costs of
such a measure. Figure 1 summarizes the structure of this decision process. At stage4
1, capital controls are set. If the government abstains from capital controls (CC = 0),
the exchange rate will be forced into floating right away.
2 Under a floating regime,
monetary policy decisions are taken by the domestic central bank. If, however, capital
controls were introduced (CC > 0), the government will only be forced into a floating
regime (i.e. to adjust) with probability θ , where  1 0 < θ < . With probability  θ − 1  the
pegging regime will prevail and monetary policy will be set abroad, that is by the
central bank governing the currency targeted by the peg. To simplify, we assume that
θ  is exogenous. Behind this assumption could be a credible contingent rule that
would let the government go off the peg in case of a large asymmetric shock either at
home or abroad. In this case, θ  would reflect the ex ante probability that such a shock
occurs.
3 Alternatively, if forex market speculation was not connected to fundamentals,
θ  could simply express the ex ante beliefs of the government that the currency attack
which led to the introduction of capital controls will eventually lead to a depletion of
currency reserves.
The economic outcomes resulting from the three different scenarios sketched
in Figure 1 depend on the expectations of the private sector, the structure of the
economy, and the domestic and (conditional on the exchange rate regime) foreign
shocks. Inflation expectations (π
e) are set at stage 2 after the decision about capital
controls has been taken, but before the actual exchange rate regime is revealed in the
capital-controls-scenario (with CC > 0) at stage 3. Behind this is the stylized fact that
expectations are often embedded in medium-term nominal contracts that do not allow
quick reversal. For the same reason we assume that monetary policy is decided after
expectations are set. Then, at stage 4, domestic (ε ) and foreign (φ ) shocks are
realized and monetary policy at home and abroad is set. Finally, at stage 5, output (y)
and inflation (π ) are realized. The indices P and F denote a pegging or floating
regime, respectively. The government will weigh the various outcomes according to
their welfare functions. Capital controls will be introduced, if the expected losses
from their introduction are smaller than the expected losses from resorting to freely
floating exchange rates. But before we can describe the government’s decision
                                                
2 This is, of course, a gross simplification. A more general setting would allow the pegging regime to
exist further with some probability even without capital controls in place (CC = 0). As long as the
probability of an adjustment or regime switch to floating was lower in this scenario than when capital
controls are introduced (CC > 0), the main thrust of our results will be unchanged.
3 This interpretation abstracts from multiple equilibria. See Obstfeld (1996) and Flood and Marion
(1999) for a discussion of the conditions under which this assumption might be met.5
process in detail, we will have to compute the equilibrium outcomes under all
scenarios.
Consider a simple structural model of a small open economy where the (log
of) output is given by a conventional Lucas supply curve
(1) ( ) ε + π − π α =
e y ,
with 0 > α  being a parameter.
4 The last term is the home country’s output shock with
known 0 ) ( = ε E and variance 
2
ε σ . Inflation is interpreted as the monetary authority’s
policy instrument under floating exchange rates. Expectations are formed before the
output shock is realized, while monetary policy is determined after the shock. The
model’s demand side is given by a stochastic purchasing power parity condition of the
form
(2) φ − π + = π
* e ,
where e is the change in the nominal exchange rate and the last two terms stand for
foreign inflation, that is, inflation in the country the government pegs its currency
against. The term  0
* > π  is average foreign inflation (the foreign inflationary bias)
and  φ  can be interpreted as the foreign central bank’s reaction to the foreign output
shock with 0 ) ( = φ E  and variance 
2
φ σ . Note that e will perfectly compensate both
changes in 
* π and  φ  when unconstrained, leaving the home country’s monetary
authority free to set inflation. Fixing the nominal exchange rate, i.e. setting e = 0,
however, will render national monetary policy endogenous to foreign monetary
policy.
When the government decides to abstain from the introduction of capital
controls, that is, under floating exchange rates, monetary authority is delegated to the
home country’s central bank, which acts to minimize expected deviations of output
and inflation from their target levels set to 
* y > 0 and  0
* = π , respectively,
(3)  () ] [
2 2 * π + − λ = y y E ELCB ,
where λ  is the weight that the central bank puts on the real target. The inverse 1/λ
might be interpreted as the country’s effective degree of monetary policy6
conservatism or stabilization culture (see Berger, Sturm and de Haan 2000).
Derivation of the central bank’s reaction function, taking into account (1), is standard.





















* ~ y λα = π  is the inflationary bias under floating exchange rates.
5
What is, however, the outcome after the introduction of capital controls? The
idea behind the introduction of capital controls is the stabilization of a fixed exchange
rate regime, and with probability  θ − 1  capital controls will indeed ensure that the
fixed exchange rate regime prevails. With probability θ , however, the government
will be forced into a floating regime, that is an exchange rate adjustment. In the latter
case, monetary policy will be set by the central bank; in the former case, monetary
policy will be imported from abroad. If expectations could be set after the actual
exchange rate regime had been observed, the economic outcome, for instance, under
capital controls and floating rates would be similar to the results computed above in
(4) and (5). However, since expectations have to be set before the actual exchange
rate regime can be observed, expectations will take into account both possible
outcomes under capital controls. We show in Appendix 1 how expectations are set as
a probability-weighted average of expected inflation under the two possible regimes.
Given expectations, we can compute the equilibrium values for output and inflation.
If the actual exchange rate regime after the introduction of capital controls was
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where the first two fractions sum up to unity. In other words, average actual inflation
will be a weighted average of the inflation biases prevailing under a pure and a
pegging regime without capital controls. A plausible assumption for many less
                                                
4 Berger, Jensen and Schjelderup (2000) use a similar set-up.
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developed economies is that the latter is larger than the former, i.e. that  π < π ~ * . If so,
average inflation is lower in this scenario than under floating exchange rates without
capital controls. Note, however, that the central bank’s equilibrium reaction to
domestic shocks is the same as under floating rates in the absence of capital controls
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and thus a positive function of the difference between the inflationary bias at home
and abroad. In other words, there is an output gain associated with floating exchange
rates under capital controls. Behind this result is the fact that inflation expectations,
having been set before the actual exchange rate regime under capital controls was
revealed, are lower than equilibrium inflation in case the regime turns out to be one of
floating rates.
Equilibrium inflation under capital controls with prevailing fixed  exchange
rates can be observed directly from (2) as
(8) φ − π = π
> * 0 CC
P  .
Using (1) and inflation expectations as described in Appendix 1, output is easily
computed as
(9) () () ε + αφ − π − π









where the first term is the output loss stemming from the fixed exchange rate regime
prevailing under capital controls. The reason for the output loss is similar to the one
given for the output gain in (7), except that now, with the actual exchange rate regime
being a peg, equilibrium inflation is lower than expected. But note that, since inflation
expectations are set rationally ex ante (and thus are correct on average), the expected
overall output gain from introducing capital controls is zero, i.e.  0
0 =
> CC Ey . This
does not imply, however, that the expected change in government welfare is zero too.
In fact, expected welfare from output is decreasing relative to the case without capital
controls, because of the added uncertainty regarding the actual output level.
We now have the necessary ingredients to discuss the government’s decision
rule for the introduction of capital controls in more detail. In the given framework, a8
natural assumption is that the government bases its decision on an expected loss
function that is similar to the one introduced for the central bank, but for the weight
the government attaches to the variance of output, i.e.  λ ≠ λ :
(10) () ] [
2 2 * π + − λ = y y E ELGov .
While a plausible conjecture would be to view the government as somewhat less
conservative then the central bank ( λ > λ ), we assume that the government cannot
actually vary or fine-tune the central bank’s preferences before setting capital
controls, as in Rogoff (1985). Establishing the independence and conservativeness of
a central bank is a time-dependent process that can be viewed as exogenous for the
policy problem at hand.
From the ex ante perspective of stage 1 (see Figure 1), the government will
move to introduce capital controls (CC  >  0) if the expected losses outweigh the
expected losses under a fully floating exchange rate regime. The expected loss under a
regime with capital controls is the probability-weighted average of the two possible
expected outcomes under this regime: with probability  θ − 1  the fixed exchange rate






P y EL  and with probability θ  the
fixed exchange rate regime will make way for floating rates despite capital controls






F y EL . If, however, the expected losses under
capital controls are larger than the expected loss under floating exchange rates without






F y EL , the government will refrain from introducing such
controls (CC = 0). Formally, we can state this rule as follows:
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Note that the decision rule allows for an additional political net-benefit B
associated with the introduction of capital controls. The net-benefit is positive (B > 0)
if the deciding authority values the allocative inefficiencies caused by imposing
capital controls higher than its political-economic advantages. For instance, we can
imagine a government that has officially fixed its exchange rate to, say, the US-dollar,
to value the upholding of its commitment in the eye of the public. To a lesser degree
this should also be true if the government has been following a policy of a “dirty
float”. Most governments will interpret the deviation from a pre-announced or9
practiced policy of fixing the national currency to a foreign currency as a sign of
weakness (see also Edwards 1996). Avoiding this will be a benefit of introducing
capital controls, lowering the expected losses in the scenario in which capital controls
successfully stabilize the fixed exchange rate regime (see first expression in the upper
line of (11)).
After substituting for the equilibrium values of output and inflation as stated in
(4) to (9), taking expectations, and some rearranging, we can rewrite the






σ σ ρ − σ + σ > π + π − π π + > φ ε φ ε φ ε
otherwise 0
~ ~   if 0 ,
2 2 2 2 * * k g d b a c B CC ,
where he have made use of the fact that  0
0 =
> CC Ey . The coefficients are,
respectively, defined as
() () ( ) ∆ λα + θ − + α λ + θ = / ] 1 1 1 [
2 2 a () () ∆ λα + λ θα − λα + = / ] [ 1
2 2 2 b
() ∆ λ − λ θα = / 2
2 c () () ()
2 2 2 1 / 2 λα + λ − λα + λ λα = d
2 1 α + = g λ α = 2 k ,
with  ()
2 2] 1 1 [ λα θ − + = ∆ . All coefficients but b and c are unambiguously positive. In
the case of b and c this is true as long as the government has a high (but not too high)
preference for output relative to the central bank.
6 Also note that  b c > .
Inequality (11’) has a straightforward interpretation. The left-hand side of the
upper line in (11’) summarizes the expected benefits from introducing capital
controls. In addition to B, the government will consider the gain from low inflation
due to imported monetary policy under a prevailing system of fixed exchange rates.
The overall benefits are likely to be positive. The right-hand side of the upper line in
(11’) reports the expected losses stemming from domestic and foreign output shocks
under capital controls. Net-losses are most likely positive, even though a positive
correlation between both shocks tends to lower the expected costs from forgoing the
                                                
6 The coefficient  b is positive if  () () () θ − θ α θ − λα θ − + < λ 1 / ] 1 1 [
2 2 2 , c is positive if  λ > λ . The latter
condition relates to the mentioned exchange rate regime uncertainty under the capital control scenario.
It ensures that, from the perspective of the government, the expected welfare loss from output
compared to the case without controls dominates the differential decrease in expected losses from
inflation. This decrease occurs because average inflation with capital controls is lower than without.10
chance to stabilize economic shocks via flexible exchange rates and domestic
stabilization policy.
From (11’) we can deduce a number of testable hypotheses about the
determinants of the decision to introduce capital controls.
Political benefits (B): for constant inefficiency losses of imposing capital controls, an
increase in the political benefits associated with keeping up a fixed exchange rate
system increases the probability that capital controls are introduced.
Durability of peg (θ ): an increase in the probability that fixed exchange rates will
give way to floating rates even after the introduction of capital controls tends to hurt
the case for the introduction of capital controls in the first place.
7 Equivalently, an
increase in the probability of the peg prevailing (a decrease in θ ) will foster the case
for capital controls.
Domestic inflation (π~ ): the larger the domestic inflationary bias, the more attractive
the introduction of capital controls for the government. The reason for this is that
capital controls increase the chances that the imported low-inflation regime (i.e. the
fixed exchange rate) prevails.
8
Foreign inflation (
* π ): an increase in imported inflation under fixed exchange rates
tends to increase the probability of capital controls being introduced at low levels of
* π . This is because increases in imported inflation from modest levels decrease the ex
ante variance of outcomes under a capital control regime. At higher levels of imported
inflation relative to domestic inflation, however, the effect is dominated by the
disadvantage of importing too high an inflationary bias from abroad.
Business cycle synchronicity: a higher correlation between the domestic country’s and
the foreign country’s output shocks ( φ ε ρ , ) clearly has a positive effect on the
probability of capital controls being introduced – the cost of such a measure (and thus
the right-hand side of (1’) above) is strictly decreasing in  φ ε ρ , . The reason for this is
simply that, with a higher covariance between both economies, imported stabilization
policy under a pegging regime prevailing with the help of capital controls is more in
line with domestic needs.
                                                
7 This is always true if the domestic inflationary bias (π~ ) is sufficiently high relative to foreign
inflation (
* π ) and the domestic central bank is not too liberal as compared to the government.
8 Domestic inflation could increase either because of an increase in y
* or (under some conditions) in λ .11
Volatility:  the model offers somewhat less guidance as to the effects of higher
volatility of the business cycle at home or abroad on the capital control decision. Rule
(11’) shows that the effect of a change in volatilities depends on the correlation of
both shocks, the relative size of the standard deviation of shocks at home and abroad,
and the model’s parameters.
9 Clearly, for  φ ε ρ , < 0, any increase in volatility in either
area would further destabilize the domestic economy under prevailing fixed exchange
rates. This would make the introduction of capital controls less attractive. For a
sufficiently large and positive  φ ε ρ , , however, the effects of changes in volatility might
diverge. Moreover, higher volatility is no longer unambiguously associated with more
capital controls. Take the example in which  φ ε ρ , > 0 and sufficiently large and the
initial level of foreign volatility is relatively low compared to home volatility. In this
case, an increase in foreign volatility will make imported stabilization policy more
active and better suited to the needs of the domestic economy. Consequently, holding
up a regime of fixed exchange rates by introducing capital controls might become
more attractive.
10 This could be an argument in favor of capital controls. At the same
time, in the described example, a further increase in domestic volatility would have
the opposite effect. Since it would further widen the gap between desired and actual
stabilization policy under fixed exchange rates, the domestic government would now
be less inclined to restrict capital movements to uphold an adjustable pegging regime.
Ultimately, the exact relation between volatility and capital controls seems to be an
empirical question.
3. The empirical model and the data
How should capital controls be measured? Previous studies of the determinants of
capital controls typically constructed dummy variables based on the information
provided in the IMF's Exchange Rate and Monetary Arrangements. For example,
Alesina, Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1994) use dummy variables to measure capital
controls in 20 OECD countries. They find that capital export controls are more likely
in countries with high inflation rates and significant government changes. Grilli and
                                                
9 The necessary conditions for an increase in 
ε σ  (in 
φ σ ) to help the case for capital controls is
) /( 2 , φ ε φ ε σ σ > ρ k d  (is  ) /( 2 , ε φ φ ε σ σ > ρ k g ).
10 See Berger, Jensen and Schjelderup (2000) for a discussion of the (perhaps equivalently surprising)
relation between volatility and exchange rate regime choice.12
Milesi-Ferretti (1995) and Milesi-Ferretti (1998) extend this analysis to more than 150
developed and less-developed countries.
11
We use this latter data set – which was kindly made available by Milesi-
Ferretti – in our analysis as it provides information for a large group of countries over
quite a long period. This is not to say, however, that these data are without drawbacks.
One problem is that dummy variables do not reflect different degrees of intensity of
capital controls over time. Moreover, they fail to distinguish between the types of
flow that are being restricted, and they ignore the fact that legal restrictions may be
circumvented.
12 However, there is one important advantage of using indicators based
on legal restrictions: they are a good expression of governments’ policy intentions. As
we are interested in testing whether capital restrictions are linked with other aspects of
government policy, notably the choice of the exchange rate regime, we use the
Alesina-Grilli-Milesi-Ferretti data on capital controls.
Figure 2 illustrates the occurrence of capital controls in our sample of 82 less
developed countries between 1980 and 1994.
13 A striking feature is that only two
types of capital controls, restrictions on current account transactions and multiple
exchange rates (for some or all capital transactions and/or currencies), seem to show
sufficient variance to validate an empirical investigation (compare Table 1 below).
14
Current account restrictions in particular have been less frequent since the mid 1980s.
The percentage of countries with that type of capital control in place increased from
about 50% in 1980 to more than 80% in the late 1980s, only to decrease rapidly to
about one third of the sample in 1994. Multiple exchange rate regulations have
declined to even smaller percentages, albeit from a much lower level in the early
1980s. In contrast, the enforced surrender of export earnings in hard currencies and
                                                
11 These authors find that capital controls are more likely to be in place in countries where monetary
policy is under the control of government. Also they are more likely to be imposed in poorer countries,
and in countries with a larger government. Finally, controls are less likely to be imposed in economies
that are open, that have a flexible exchange rate system and no current account difficulties.
12 Alternatives are based on either interest differentials or more detailed indices. For instance, Lemmen
and Eijffinger (1996) have measured differentials between domestic onshore and offshore nominal
interest rates in European Union countries as indicators for capital controls. Resulting negative
(positive) deviations are associated with capital export (import) restrictions. They conclude that
inflation, government instability and gross fixed capital formation can provide a reasonable explanation
of capital controls in the EU. Data on interest differentials are, however, not available for most
countries in our sample. Recently, Tamirisa (1999) used an index based on 142 individual types of
national exchange and capital controls. Unfortunately, this index is available only for 1996. Likewise,
Quinn’s (1997) indicator, which ranges from 0 to 4 and which has been used by Edwards (2001), is
only available for a limited period.
13 The sample available in the empirical model is smaller. See below.13
the occurrence of restrictions for capital transactions (for resident-owned funds) seem
to be a very widespread and more or less permanent (or time-invariant) feature in the
sample. More than 80% of the sample countries still have such capital controls in
place. Moreover, there is hardly any change in the distribution among countries.
Consequently, in what follows, we will focus our empirical investigation on current
account restrictions and, as a robustness check, on multiple exchange rates.







































Restrictions on Current Account Trans.
Restrictions on Capital Account Trans.
Surrender of Export Proceeds
Before we move on to discuss data on the determinants of these capital control
measures, we need to specify the sample selection. In line with the model described in
Section 2, the sample should be restricted to observations with de facto  fixed
exchange rate regimes. To fulfill this requirement, we follow Kraay (2000), who uses
monthly data on nominal exchange rate movements to select years and countries with
de facto pegging regimes (see Appendix 2 for details). An exchange rate regime is
defined as de facto fixed if the average over the previous twelve months of the
absolute value of percentage changes in the nominal exchange rate does not exceed
2.5%, or about one half of one standard deviation from the mean for the entire sample.
Hence, we only consider those observations on capital controls for which the
exchange rate has been relatively stable either in the current or the previous year.
Note that the observed stability of the exchange rate need not imply absence of a
                                                
14 See Milesi-Ferretti (1998) for further details on these restrictions.14
(non-successful) speculative attack. This procedure reduces our sample from 741
observations for 58 countries for which we have both data on capital controls and
explanatory variables to a sample of 564 observations from 53 countries.
15 Table 1
shows summary statistics and short descriptions of the variables used in the empirical
analysis (see Appendix 2 for details).
[Table 1 about here]
Another issue of importance is the identification of target areas. To construct
the exchange rates just discussed as well as measures for foreign inflation and foreign
business cycle volatility, we have to identify to which currency (or basket of
currencies) a given country in a particular year is effectively or potentially pegging its
currency. Here we rely mainly on the data provided in the IMF’s annual reports. The
IMF reports whether countries peg to the US dollar, the French franc, the SDR (i.e.
IMF Special Drawing Rights), or any other currency or composite. For those countries
pegging to an unknown basket of currencies we opt to construct a composite
exchange rate based on trade shares (see Appendix 2). A detailed list of the target
areas for each country can be found in Berger, Sturm and de Haan (2000, Table A1).
[Table 2 about here]
Table 2 presents the results of our main empirical model. Reported are the
estimated coefficients of a random effects probit model for the aforementioned panel
of 53 countries between 1980 and 1994. The Log-Likelihood statistics given on the
bottom indicate that random effects are indeed the proper set-up for the data at hand.
The left-hand side of the estimated model consists of CURAC, the bivariate dummy-
variable specifying occurrence of restrictions on current account transaction in a given
country and year. The models predict about 2/3 of the observations on CURAC
correctly and thus provide a reasonably good description of the data. Column (1)
reports the estimated coefficients and their t-statistics for our base model, while
columns (2) to (9) provide further results including additional variables as a
                                                
15 The reason for including both the current and the previous year is that all observations on capital
controls and their determinants are made on an annual basis and thus are less precise than the monthly
data on nominal exchange rates. Note that most of our results do not depend on the sample selection.15
robustness test. This additional result, as well as an application of the empirical model
to the occurrence of multiple exchange rates, will be discussed in more detail in
Section 4. In what follows, we focus on the base model and CURAC.
The base model is founded on the theoretical considerations discussed in
Section 2. We have pre-selected our sample to include only observations on fixed
exchange rates (see above) and any such exchange rate regime might come under a
speculative attack. To control for variance in the intensity of such attacks, we
introduce SPECATTD, a dummy variable that is 1 in the case of a speculative attack
of certain size on a country’s (de facto) fixed exchange rate in a given year and 0
otherwise. An attack is defined as an observed sharp loss in non-gold reserves
measured in US dollars in at least one month exceeding 40% – or about two standard
observations of the average monthly non-gold reserve change in our sample.
16 As a
rule, it should be expected that the occurrence of pressure on the forex markets would
increase the probability of capital controls being introduced. Indeed, there is a positive
and significant influence of SPECATTD in column (1) of Table 2.
The anticipated durability of a peg is captured by GRRES51. This variable
measures the average growth of international reserves in the five years preceding the
current year. (Appendix 2 offers a more detailed account of the construction of all
variables used in the empirical exercise.) Arguably, a history of strongly increasing
reserves decreases the probability that an existing peg will give way to floating
exchange rates even after the introduction of capital controls. Consequently, as
discussed in the previous section, we might expect such an increase to lower the
likelihood of restrictions on current account transactions to be introduced. Column (1)
shows that the coefficient for GRRES51 in the base model is estimated to be
significantly negative, which is in line with this expectation.
A second right-hand-side variable suggested by Section 2 is political benefits
associated with prolonging the existence of a fixed exchange rate regime. The higher
these benefits stemming from, for instance, the upholding of a public commitment of
a government to peg to a basket of foreign currencies, the larger the likelihood that a
country introduces capital controls. A plausible assumption is that these benefits will
be larger, the longer such a commitment is in place. PEGIMF51 measures the average
number of years a country has publicly declared (to the IMF) its exchange rate to be
                                                
16 Note that GRRES51, which is based on a similar aggregate, excludes the current period.16
fixed against the US dollar or any other currency or composite in the previous five
years.
17 The data is taken from the IMF’s annual reports. And indeed, judging from
column (1), countries with an “older” public commitment to fixed exchange rates are
significantly more likely to introduce controls on current account transactions than
others.
In addition to the political benefits stemming from upholding an official
commitment to fixed exchange rates, however, there might also be political costs. For
instance, the number and/or influence of private interests lobbying for an unlimited
flow of funds across borders will be larger in more open economies. To control for
this influence, we include OPEN51, the average degree of openness of a country in
the five years preceding the current year. Openness might also be an (albeit very
crude) indicator of the allocative inefficiencies caused by capital controls. The
variable should have a negative sign. This is indeed the empirical finding reported in
column (1) of Table 2. OPEN51 exhibits a significant and negative influence on the
probability of CURAC taking on the value 1. That is, more open economies tend to be
less likely to introduce restrictions on current account transactions. Incidentally,
measures of openness have repeatedly been reported to decrease the probability for
introduction of fixed exchange rates (Collins 1996, Berger, Sturm and de Haan
2000).
18
Domestic inflation is another variable in the base model. As discussed, a
higher rate of domestic inflation should make the introduction of capital controls more
likely. Such controls might help to extend the life of a fixed exchange rate regime and
the nominal anchor it provides for domestic inflation. As observed inflation data is
heavily distorted by periods of hyperinflation in the sample, we follow Collins (1996)
and opt for an indirect measure of inflation aversion. DUMMIH75 is a binary variable
that takes the value 1 if a country in a given year shows CPI-inflation in the upper
17.5% of all sample observations and 0 otherwise. The exact threshold is somewhat
arbitrary, but we get broadly comparable results with alternative cut-off points. From
column (1) in Table 2 we see that, in line with theory, countries with relatively high
                                                
17 The current year is excluded to avoid a possible simultaneity problem.
18 An alternative explanation for the influence of openness stemming from this line of thought is that
more open economies have deeper and more resilient forex markets that lower the expected volatility
(and thus the expected costs) of freely floating exchange rates. By extension, it might be conjectured
that a higher degree of openness makes it less likely that controls on current account transactions are17
inflation were significantly more likely to introduce controls on current account
transactions than others.
Foreign inflation, that is CPI-inflation in the (mostly industrialized) countries
at which a government might target its exchange rate, is less contaminated by extreme
observations.
19 Accordingly, we use DCPI51, the average rate of inflation in the
previous five years, as the fourth variable in the base model. Foreign inflation has a
significant and positive impact on the probability that current account transactions are
restricted by regulatory controls. This is in line with theory which suggests such a
positive effect for sufficiently low levels of foreign inflation.
CORGDP, VARGDPH and VARGDPT are the empirical equivalent of the
volatility-related arguments in the theoretical model. CORGDP represents business
cycle synchronicity. It is defined as the correlation between the Hodrick-Prescott-
filtered growth rates of real GDP in the domestic country and the target area. Section
2 suggests an unambiguously positive influence of synchronicity on the probability of
capital controls being introduced. This is borne out by column (1) in Table 2, which
shows a significant positive coefficient for CORGDP. Volatility of real GDP at home
and abroad in the target area is measured by the variance of the Hodrick-Prescott-
filtered growth rates of real GDP (VARGDPH). Here theory offers less guidance as to
what exactly to expect from the empirical exercise – except that both variables should
influence the capital control decision. From Table 2 we learn that the likelihood of
current account controls being introduced is significantly decreasing in domestic
business cycle volatility, but significantly increasing in foreign business cycle
volatility (VARGDPT). Section 2 already discussed a possible explanation for such a
finding based on our theoretical model.
20
[Table 3 about here]
                                                
introduced to save a regime with fixed exchange rates. See Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) and Milesi-
Ferretti (1998) on the empirical influence of openness on capital controls.
19 See the note on the selection of target areas in the main text above.
20 An interesting observation pointing in that direction is that the sample mean of VARGDPH
conditional on CORGDP being positive and large (0.3 or higher) is smaller than the conditional sample
mean of VARGDPT. This seems to support the idea that an increase in the latter will bring imported
stabilization policy under a pegging regime more in line with domestic needs. As discussed in the
previous section, this might help the case for capital controls.18
What are the quantitative effects associated with the estimated base model?
The upper panel in Table 3 reports the marginal effects of a change in the right-hand-
side variables on the probability of CURAC being 1 in the base model evaluated at
sample means (first column). T-statistics and means are shown in columns two and
three. To put the estimated marginal effects into perspective, the last column shows
the implied impact of a one-standard-deviation increase in each right-hand-side
variable on CURAC, assuming that the marginal impact is constant. “Impact” is
expressed in units of CURAC standard deviation. Overall, the quantitative impact of
the base model seems all but negligible. For about half of the right-hand-side
variables the impact of a one-standard-deviation increase is between 0.4 and 0.5, with
openness and foreign output variance standing out as having an especially strong
impact on CURAC. The smallest impact is noted for home inflation and the
occurrence of speculative attacks (about 0.2).
4. Robustness checks
A number of other variables might have an influence on the probability of capital
controls being introduced. As well as the evaluation of additional arguments, the
inclusion of further variables into the base model can also help to check the
robustness of the results reported above. Regarding robustness, the main message
stemming from columns (2) to (9) in Table 2 is quite reassuring. With the possible
exception of domestic inflation (DUMIH75) and the measure of speculative pressure
(SPECATTD), the theoretically deduced determinants remain mostly significant
across models.
A first additional argument to be introduced into the base model is the
situation at the world capital market. Bartolini and Drazen (1997) have suggested that
developing countries use policies of capital mobility as a signal of their policy
intentions towards foreign investments. However, in times of rising interest rates, for
instance, in the U.S. capital market, the reflux of funds from developing countries will
reduce their willingness to produce such signals and liberalize current or capital
account transactions. And indeed, USR, the nominal three-month treasury bill rate,
exhibits a significantly positive effect on the probability that current account
transactions are restricted (see column (2) in Table 2). This supports more casual
evidence presented by Bartolini and Drazen (1997, Figure 1). Note that, even though19
there is some collinearity between USR and DCPIT51 that reduces the impact of the
latter variable, the results for the base model hardly change.
21
Some impact on CURAC could also be expected of population size
(LPOPAVG) and lagged real per capita income (LYPC1). In particular, the latter
variable might be of some importance because, as argued by Mussa et al. (2000), the
integration into world capital markets is a positive function of the economic
development of a country. Higher income countries might be more likely to see their
currency peg under pressure on the forex market simply because they are more
involved in the international capital market and thus more vulnerable to changes in
cross-country capital flows. This, in turn, could make it more attractive for them to
resort to capital controls. However, while both variables seem to interact with
openness and some other country-specific variables, neither of them is significant
itself (see columns (3) and (4) in Table 2).
Columns (5) to (7) report the results for a number of political economic
variables being added to the base model. EIEC is an indicator of the intensity of
political competition (provided by Beck et al. 1999) and CRGOV51 measures the
average number of government crises in the previous five years (provided by Sierman
1998). An increase in either variable should indicate a shortening of the time horizon
of government. Following arguments by Edwards (1994), one might speculate that a
more shortsighted government is less prone to introduce capital controls to uphold a
longer-term commitment to limit inflation via an exchange rate peg. However, while
it seems that both variables have the expected negative effect (see columns (5) and
(6)), they only border significance. Similarly, the ideological color of government
does not seem to play a significant role. LEFT, a dummy-variable signaling a left-
wing government, has a positive but not a significant influence on the probability of
CURAC taking the value 1. There is, however, some evidence that the introduction of
restrictions on current account transactions is significantly positive related to political
unrest. While there is no significant relation between STRIKE51, the average number
of strikes in the previous five years, and CURAC, the average number of anti-
government demonstrations in the previous five years, DEMON51, has a significantly
positive influence (see column (7) in Table 2). A possible explanation is that
governments want to limit capital flight channeled through current account
                                                
21 Results for the real treasury rate are similar.20
transactions. All in all, however, the link between political economic factors and
capital controls seems to be rather weak.
A last variable to be added to the base model is DEBTGDP1, the lagged ratio
of external foreign currency debt to GDP. A higher debt level seems to be
significantly positive related to the probability of current account controls being
introduced. But note that this comes amidst serious collinearity between the left-hand-
side variables. As already discussed in Berger, Sturm and de Haan (2000),
DEBTGDP51 is highly negatively correlated with CORGDP51 – foreign funds seem
to be flowing more rapidly into developing countries when the business cycles at
home and abroad diverge. And indeed, when one instruments DEBTGDP51 by its
own lagged value and CORGDP51, the debt variable loses its significance, while the
performance of the base model is strengthened (see DBYC2 in column (9)). Note,
however, that the use of debt severely limits the number of available observations
compared to the previous models.
What is the quantitative impact of the additional variables just reviewed?
Returning to Table 3 (lower panel) above, we find that, as a rule, the marginal effects
of the extension variables remain relatively small. With the possible exception of real
per capita income and the ideology variable (neither of which is significant), all
estimated marginal coefficients and “impact” indicators remain small compared to
those of the base model (compare Table 3, upper panel).
[Table 4 about here]
Table 4 presents the results of an application of the empirical models
discussed in Sections 3 and 4 to MULTEX, a 0,1-variable indicating the presence of
multiple exchange rate regulation. Judged by the results for the base regression and its
robustness across columns, the models’ performance is somewhat weaker with
MULTEX than with CURAC. This does not come as a surprise given the lack of
variance in the left-hand-side variable as already discussed (see Figure 2 in Section 3
and Table 1). Still, with the exception of the measures for foreign and domestic
inflation, the right-hand-side variables of the base model in column (1) act in21
remarkably similar ways in Tables 4 and 2.
22 With regard to the additional variables
introduced in columns (2) to (9), it is perhaps interesting that the occurrence of
MULTEX is significantly influenced by population size (negative), income level
(positive) and the presence of a “left-wing” ideology in government (positive).
Neither of these factors played a significant role in explaining current account
controls. Overall, however, Table 4 seems to support the findings reported on
CURAC above.
5. Conclusion
In the wake of the financial crises of the late 1990s, the question of the proper
exchange rate regime choice for developing countries and emerging markets has
caught the interest of economists and policy makers alike. A common notion is, in the
light of the increased capital mobility and widespread deregulation of capital controls
during the last decade, that the intermediate solution of the adjustable peg is no longer
a feasible option for countries involved in the world capital market. Indeed, fewer and
fewer governments publicly commit to an intermediate monetary regime and more
and more countries declare their monetary regime to be one of floating exchange
rates. While some of this recent development amounts to window dressing, i.e. a mere
redefinition of adjustable pegs as floats as, for instance, Mussa et al. (2000) report,
there certainly is a major movement towards more flexible exchange rate
arrangements. But is this really due to an exogenous change in determinants such as
the observed decrease in capital controls?
The answer of the present paper is no. We argue that an important part of the
observed shift away from capital controls is endogenous. We have developed a simple
model that links the decision to liberalize cross-country transactions to exchange rate
regime choice, determining both institutions simultaneously. Testing the model with
data for 53 non-OECD countries covering the period 1980-94, we find that much of
the observed decline in the use of restrictions on current account transactions is due to
a decrease in the attractiveness of fixed exchange rates. A similar result is obtained
for regulations on multiple exchange rates. (Other forms of capital controls, such as
                                                
22 Inflation is rarely significant and, where it is (see DUMIH75 in columns (1) and (3) of Table 4), its
sign is changed compared to Table 2. No other variable that is significant in the CURAC model
changes its sign when significant in the MULTEX model.22
the enforced surrender of export proceeds or explicit restrictions on capital
transactions, show hardly any variance over time and across countries.)
What are the determinants of capital control decisions? We conclude on the
basis of our theoretical and empirical analysis that the durability of a peg measured on
the basis of the growth of international reserves, the political benefits of a
commitment to a peg, domestic and foreign inflation (aversion), as well as business
cycle volatility and synchronization are the main determinants of capital controls.
We conclude that much of the recently observed decrease in the level of
capital controls in emerging markets and developing countries should not be viewed
as an exogenous determinant of exchange rate regimes. Rather, the decline in capital
controls should be seen as endogenous to the exchange rate regime decision.23
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Appendix 1: Inflation Expectations under Capital Controls
In line with the assumption made about the exogenous nature of θ , the probability
that the government will be forced into a floating regime, expectations are set as the
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Actual inflation under a pegging regime can be derived from (2), which reduces to
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(see (8) in the main text) with
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P E  being the inflationary bias imported from
abroad under a pegging regime. If, despite the introduction of capital controls, the
actual exchange rate regime turns out to be a float, inflation will be determined by the
domestic central bank. Minimizing its loss function (3) with regard to π  under this
scenario we find
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where the sum of the two fractions is just unity. That is, expected inflation after the
introduction of capital controls is a weighted average of the inflationary biases
prevailing abroad and under a floating exchange rate regime at home.26
Appendix 2: Data
Data Source
Unless mentioned otherwise all underlying data are from the International Financial
Statistics of the IMF. Series ending with ‘AVG’ mean that they are averages over the
entire period. Those ending with ‘5’ are five-year backward-looking moving averages.
In order not to lose valuable observations, the underlying series for these variables
start in 1975. If a series name (also) ends with a ‘1’ it means that it is lagged one
period. An additional ‘D’ in front of a name indicates that first-differences over time
are taken.
Sample Selection and actual or potential pegged-to-currency (TARGET)
In the empirical analysis we concentrate on a large set of developing countries,
covering the period 1980-1994. To construct many of our explanatory variables we
have to identify which currency (basket) each country effectively pegs its currency to
in each year. The IMF reports whether countries peg to the US dollar, the French
franc, the SDR, or any other currency or composite. For those countries pegging to an
unknown basket of currencies we opt to construct a composite exchange rate based on
the relative shares of the three to six countries with whom they trade the most. The
trade data is taken from IMF’s Trade Statistics. To determine which countries non-
pegging countries would potentially peg to, we look at their history. If they have
never pegged we choose to use the US dollar or the SDR as their potential target
currency. A detailed list of the target areas for each country can be found in Berger,
Sturm and de Haan (2000, Table A1).
When selecting our sample, we require the recent exchange rate to have been
“relatively” fixed. Following Kraay (2000), we use monthly data to construct for each
observation an average over the previous twelve months of the absolute value of
percentage changes in the nominal exchange rate (in terms of the (potential) target
currency (basket)). We then construct a dummy that equals one during all episodes for
which this average does not exceed 2.5%, or about one half of one standard deviation
from the mean for the entire sample. When converting this measure to annual
frequency, we only select those observations in which the sum of the monthly dummy
variable equals 12 in this year or in the previous year. Hence, we only consider those
(annual) observations for which the exchange rate has been “relatively” stable either27
this year or the previous year. This reduces our entire sample of 741 observations
from 58 countries to a sample 564 observations from 53 countries.
The 53 countries in the sample are: Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh,
Belize, Botswana, Burundi, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala,
Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Korea (South), Kuwait,
Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan,
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Swaziland,
Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela and
Zimbabwe.
Capital control measures (CURAC, MULTX, CAPAC, EXPPR)
Gian Maria Milesi-Ferreti has kindly provided capital control measures. The dummies
indicate restrictions on current account transactions, multiple exchange rates,
restrictions on capital account transactions and surrender of export proceeds,
respectively.
Speculative attack dummy (SPECATTD)
We identify speculative attacks by using a dummy-indicator of speculative pressure:
sharp reserve losses. Specifically, we consider all episodes in which the monthly
decline in non-gold reserves measured in US dollars exceeds 40%, which is about two
standard deviations above the mean change for the entire sample. Converting this to
annual data, we consider each year in which a severe decline like this occurs at least
once as a year in which there has been a speculative attack.
Inflation measures (DUMIH75, DCPIT51)
We use the percentage change in the consumer price index in both the home and
target country as our measure for inflation. For both measures we take the lagged 5-
year moving average. As the inflation rate in some of the developing (home) countries
is sometimes rather extreme, we opted to construct a dummy variable for the home
countries. (As most target countries are OECD countries, this problem does not
prevail there.) The 17.5% of the observations showing the highest inflation rates will
have the value one in the dummy variable DUMIH75.28
Growth in international reserves (GRRES51)
We use the lagged 5-year moving average growth rate of international reserves
denominated in SDR. The series is available on an annual basis only.
Official pegging strategy (PEGIMF51)
The IMF classifies each country into different categories concerning their exchange
rate regime. We declare countries which peg to the US dollar, the French franc, the
SDR, or any other currency or composite as ‘pegging’ countries. Countries with a
(semi-) flexible exchange rate are considered to be non-pegging. To construct our
explanatory variable PEGIMF51, we take the lagged 5-year moving average of this
fixed exchange rate dummy.
Variance real GDP shocks home (VARGDPH) and target countries (VARGDPT) and
the correlation between both real GDP shocks (CORGDP)
To construct an empirical measure for the variance of the home and foreign countries
output shocks we have used the following procedure. For the home and foreign
country we have calculated the real GDP growth rates in local currency and US dollar,
respectively, over the period 1971-1994. In case the home country (potentially) pegs
to a composite, the real GDP growth rate of the foreign country is computed by using
a weighted average of the underlying countries. For the SDRs the weights are 0.4,
0.21, 0.17, 0.11 and 0.11 for, respectively, the United States, Germany, Japan, France,
and the United Kingdom. For other composites the weights are according to their
trade shares. For each ten-year period in which there are more than three observations
available we apply the Hodrick-Prescott technique to filter out the shocks in output
growth (for both the home and foreign country). The variance of these output shocks
for the sample 1980-1989 are then, for instance, taken as a measure for the variance of
the output shock in the year 1990. We also calculated the correlation between the
output shocks of the home and foreign country over all these ten-year periods. This is
our measure for the correlation between both output shocks.
Openness (OPEN51)
Openness is measured as the sum of total imports and exports as a percentage of GDP.29
US interest rate (USR)
We use the US 3-month treasure bill rate as our world interest measure.
Average log population (LPOPAVG)
To have a measure for the size of a country we include the average logarithm of the
population of the country.
Log of real GDP per capita (LYPC1)
Simply the log of real GDP per capita.
Political instability (CRGOV51, DEMON51, STRIKE51)
In order to capture political uncertainty or instability, we include three variables
indicating socio-political unrest. Those variables are the number of strikes, government
crises, and anti-government demonstrations, and are taken from Sierman (1998).
In the initial analysis we also used data from the Barro-Lee data set (number of political
assassinations, number of military coups and revolutions, a dummy for countries that
have been involved in war at any time between 1960 and 1990), Knack and Keefer
(1995) (political instability, and an index of civil liberties), and Barro (1996) (political
rights). As these variables are only available at a cross-section level averaging over a
much longer period than used in this analysis and were not available for as many
countries as the Sierman (1998) data, we opted to use the Sierman (1998) data in the
final analysis. This does not influence our conclusions.
Political institutions (EIEC, LEFT)
We use two measures of political institutions. The first is an executive index of
electoral competitiveness. It can take on values between 1 and 7. (1: no executive; 2:
unelected executive; 3: elected, 1 candidate; 4: 1 party, multiple candidates; 5:
multiple parties are legal, but only one party won seats; 6: multiple parties did win
seats but largest party received more than 75% of the seats; 7: largest party got less
than 75%).
The second is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the party of the chief executive is a
left-wing party, and zero otherwise. Both measures are taken from the database of
political institutions, version 2.0, constructed by Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer and
Walsh (1999).30
External debt as percentage of GDP (DEBTGDP1, DBTYC2)
Total external debt is taken from the World Bank Development Indicators and is
defined as debt owed to non-residents repayable in foreign currency, goods, or
services denominated in US dollars. Total external debt is the sum of public, publicly
guaranteed, and private non-guaranteed long-term debt, use of IMF credit, and short-
term debt. Short-term debt includes all debt having an original maturity of one year or
less and interest in arrears on long-term debt. Before calculating its share in GDP, we
transformed GDP into US dollars by using the annual exchange rate.
Our second measure, DBTYC2, is the residual from a linear regression explaining
DEBTGDP1 using a constant, lagged DEBTGDP1 and CORGDP as explanatory
variables.
Tables A1 and A2 summarize the above. The first gives all underlying series needed
to construct the variables shown in the latter. Table 1 shows summary statistic and
short descriptions of all variables used in the empirical analysis.31
Table A1: Original series used to construct the different variables
Series Description Unit Frequency Countries Source
CURAC Capital controls: multiple exchange rates Dummy Annual Home Gian Maria Milesi-Ferreti
MULTX Capital controls: restrictions on current account trans. Dummy Annual Home Gian Maria Milesi-Ferreti
CAPAC Capital controls: restrictions on capital account trans. Dummy Annual Home Gian Maria Milesi-Ferreti
EXPPR Capital controls: surrender of export proceeds Dummy Annual Home Gian Maria Milesi-Ferreti
TARGET Actual or potential pegged-to-currency Dummy Annual Home IMF Trade Statistics
EXCH Monthly exchange rate Local currency per US$ Monthly Home  &
Target
IFS cd-rom
AEXCH Annual exchange rate Local currency per US$ Annual Home  &
Target
IFS cd-rom
SDRDOL Annual SDR exchange rate SDR per US$ Annual Home IFS cd-rom
PEGIMF Official pegging strategy Dummy Annual Home IMF
RES Total reserves minus gold US$ Monthly Home IFS cd-rom
INTRES International reserves SDR Annual Home IFS cd-rom





GDPNOM Nominal GDP Local currency Annual Home IFS cd-rom
DCPI Changes in consumer prices Percentage Annual Home  &
Target
IFS cd-rom
DEBT External debt US$ Annual Home World Bank
IMP Nominal imports Local currency Annual Home IFS cd-rom
EXP Nominal exports Local currency Annual Home IFS cd-rom
USR 3-month treasury bill rate Percentage Annual Home Federal Reserve Board of Governors
POP Population Number Annual Home IFS cd-rom
STRIKE Strikes Dummy Annual Home Clemens Sierman
CRGOV Crisis (government) Dummy Annual Home Clemens Sierman
DEMON Anti-government demonstrations Dummy Annual Home Clemens Sierman
EIEC Executive index of electoral competitiveness Dummy Annual Home Database of Political Institutions
LEFT Dummy equals 1 if party of chief executive is left-wing Dummy Annual Home Database of Political Institutions32
Table A2: Constructed variables used in the empirical analysis
Series Description Underlying series
SPECATTD Dummy measuring speculative attacks RES
DUMIH75 Dummy measuring upper 25%-tile of lagged 5-
year moving average change in Consumer Price
Index in home country
DCPI
DCPIT51 Lagged 5-year moving average change in
Consumer Price Index in target country
DCPI
CORGDP Correlation Real GDP shock TARGET, GDP, AEXCH
VARGDPH Variance real GDP shocks home GDP
VARGDPT Variance real GDP shocks target TARGET, GDP, AEXCH
GRRES51 Lagged 5-year moving average growth rate in
international reserves
INTRES, SDRDOL, AEXCH
PEGIMF51 Lagged 5-year moving average of fixed exchange
rate dummy based on IMF reports
PEGIMF
OPEN51 Lagged 5-year moving average openness. IMP, EXP, GDPNOM
LPOPAVG Average log population POP
LYPC1 Lagged log of real per capita income GDP, POP, AEXCH
CRGOV51 Lagged 5-year moving average government crises CRGOV
DEMON51 Lagged 5-year moving average Anti-government
demonstrations
DEMON
STRIKE51 Lagged 5-year moving average strikes STRIKE
DEBTGDP1 Lagged external debt as percentage of GDP DEBT, AEXCH, GDPNOM
DBTYC2 Lagged External debt as percentage of GDP
corrected for its lagged value and CORGDP
DEBT, AEXCH, GDPNOM,
TARGET, GDP33
Table 1: Summary statistics and
short description of variables used in the analysis
Series Obs Mean Std.
Error
Min Max Short description
(see Appendix 2 for details)
CURAC 564 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00 Indicator of current account transactions
MULTX 564 0.25 0.44 0.00 1.00 Indicator of multiple exchange rates
CAPAC 564 0.86 0.35 0.00 1.00 Indicator of capital account transactions
EXPPR 564 0.87 0.34 0.00 1.00 Indicator of export proceeds restrictions
SPECATTD 564 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 Dummy for speculative attack
DUMIH75 564 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 Dummy for high home CPI-inflation
DCPIT51 564 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.14 Foreign inflation rate
CORGDP 564 0.21 0.26 -0.76 0.91 Correlation btw. home and foreign output shock
VARGDPH 564 0.22 0.18 0.02 1.12 Variance of home output shock
VARGDPT 564 0.29 0.41 0.03 1.92 Variance of foreign output shock
GRRES51 564 0.07 0.18 -0.61 0.66 Growth of international reserves
PEGIMF51 564 0.61 0.44 0.00 1.00 Official pegging history according to IMF
OPEN51 564 0.69 0.43 0.14 2.20 Measure of Openness
USR 564 7.60 3.39 3.02 14.73 US interest rate
LPOPAVG 564 15.84 1.87 11.68 20.37 Average population size (in logs)
LYPC1 562 7.61 1.62 4.84 21.28 Real per capita GDP (in logs)
EIEC 564 5.07 2.26 2.00 7.00 Index of electoral competition
CRGOV51 559 0.09 0.17 0.00 1.00 Number of government crises
LEFT 538 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 Dummy for left-wing government
DEMON51 559 0.97 1.97 0.00 12.20 Number of anti-government demonstrations
STRIKE51 559 0.24 0.50 0.00 3.00 Number of strikes
DEBTGDP1 441 0.49 0.27 0.05 1.66 External debt in % GDP
DBTYC2 404 0.00 0.07 -0.22 0.31 DEBTGDP1 explained by lagged DEBTGDP1 and
CORGDP34
Table 2: Explaining Current Account Controls (CURAC)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Variable Param. t-ratio Param. t-ratio Param. t-ratio Param. t-ratio Param. t-ratio Param. t-ratio Param. t-ratio Param. t-ratio Param. t-ratio
Constant -0.05 -0.12 -0.33 -0.81 -3.46 -1.25 2.24 3.05 0.75 1.28 -0.35 -0.63 0.17 0.31 -0.35 -0.40 1.75 3.14
SPECATTD 0.83 2.85 0.89 2.91 0.42 1.13 0.33 1.19 0.76 2.32 0.52 0.79 1.01 2.72 0.73 1.14 0.79 1.47
GRRES51 -3.25 -6.70 -3.47 -7.29 -3.86 -6.18 -3.24 -5.17 -3.25 -6.06 -3.73 -6.16 -3.07 -5.14 -2.13 -3.02 -1.45 -1.36
PEGIMF51 1.38 4.89 1.33 4.54 1.50 3.72 0.94 3.07 1.30 4.30 1.68 4.18 1.50 4.02 2.31 4.23 2.37 4.60
OPEN51 -1.69 -2.76 -1.53 -2.60 -1.43 -1.81 -3.14 -4.26 -1.71 -2.65 -2.51 -4.05 -1.96 -2.67 -3.16 -3.71 -5.22 -4.76
DUMIH75 0.82 2.28 0.90 2.40 0.41 1.21 0.84 2.48 0.79 1.87 1.03 2.55 0.45 1.04 0.20 0.46 0.50 0.91
DCPIT51 10.88 2.79 2.96 0.65 11.83 2.21 18.03 3.22 8.99 1.77 13.19 2.83 12.11 2.84 11.45 1.92 12.88 1.85
CORGDP 1.43 3.12 1.41 3.13 1.18 2.08 1.21 1.83 1.31 2.60 2.30 4.97 1.31 2.11 1.54 1.44 3.47 3.64
VARGDPH -2.29 -2.88 -2.13 -2.62 -2.86 -3.51 -3.52 -3.43 -2.47 -2.72 -2.46 -2.72 -2.43 -2.71 -1.33 -1.38 -4.03 -3.23











Rho 0.85 27.59 0.85 29.67 0.77 24.98 0.82 18.92 0.85 25.39 0.87 32.73 0.86 29.78 0.91 28.27 0.91 35.73
Log-L -179.28 -176.89 -180.96 -176.10 -174.15 -164.79 -173.37 -129.08 -111.47
LogLNoRE -316.55 -316.29 -314.62 -310.45 -301.40 -288.70 -305.48 -238.48 -220.79
# obs. 564 564 564 562 559 538 554 441 404
# countries 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 45 44
% correct 0.68 0.70 0.69 0.66 0.68 0.67 0.69 0.67 0.6535
Table 3: Marginal Effects
Parameter t-ratio Mean Impact
a
Base model
SPECATTD 0.276 2.775 0.138 0.201
GRRES51 -1.077 -6.434 0.066 -0.404
PEGIMF51 0.457 4.545 0.615 0.419
OPEN51 -0.560 -2.814 0.694 -0.502
DUMIH75 0.270 2.387 0.176 0.214
DCPIT51 3.601 2.743 0.059 0.225
CORGDP 0.475 2.890 0.211 0.257
VARGDPH -0.757 -2.632 0.220 -0.284
VARGDPT 0.568 3.571 0.293 0.485
Extensions
b
USR 0.027 2.954 7.598 0.194
LPOPAVG 0.040 1.756 15.837 0.158
LYPC1 -0.066 -1.523 7.615 -0.223
EIEC -0.021 -1.675 5.094 -0.101
CRGOV51 -0.459 -1.859 0.087 -0.159
LEFT 0.345 1.756 0.249 0.313
DEMON51 0.055 2.951 0.973 0.225
STRIKE51 0.050 0.824 0.244 0.052
DEBTGDP1 0.255 2.077 0.495 0.144
DBTYC2 0.046 0.134 0.000 0.007
a “Impact” is defined as the marginal effect of a variable estimated
at sample means multiplied by the variable’s standard deviation
divided by the standard deviation of CURAC. See Table 1 for the
standard deviations.
b The estimates for the “Extensions” refer to columns (2) and
following in Table 2. The respective results for the other variables
in the extended models are available on request.36
Table 4: Explaining Multiple Exchange Rates (MULTX)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Variable Param. t-ratio Param. t-ratio Param. t-ratio Param. t-ratio Param. t-ratio Param. t-ratio Param. t-ratio Param. t-ratio Param. t-ratio
Constant -0.45 -0.67 -0.80 -1.33 11.58 2.38 -4.38 -4.24 -1.52 -2.79 -2.95 -4.76 -1.88 -3.26 -0.83 -0.99 1.44 1.77
SPECATTD -0.13 -0.26 0.17 0.52 0.40 1.33 -0.07 -0.18 0.07 0.27 0.54 1.33 0.36 1.00 0.09 0.10 0.65 0.77
GRRES51 -2.39 -3.79 -2.42 -4.20 -2.24 -3.90 -3.06 -4.30 -1.87 -3.23 -3.01 -3.38 -1.83 -2.85 -2.49 -2.16 -2.18 -1.63
PEGIMF51 1.64 2.85 2.81 4.74 2.35 4.83 2.71 4.35 2.48 3.97 1.94 3.38 2.51 4.52 1.77 2.75 3.46 4.45
OPEN51 -2.99 -3.35 -4.69 -6.18 -5.84 -3.51 -2.57 -3.55 -2.83 -3.79 -2.98 -2.89 -2.67 -4.03 -5.51 -4.21 -10.62 -4.83
DUMIH75 -0.56 -2.00 -0.21 -0.60 -0.79 -2.95 -0.01 -0.04 -0.11 -0.33 -0.15 -0.64 -0.44 -1.29 -0.28 -0.55 -0.06 -0.10
DCPIT51 -0.24 -0.04 -4.36 -0.58 -1.93 -0.36 -12.82 -1.34 -0.12 -0.02 -6.07 -1.07 1.96 0.25 7.05 0.70 -4.07 -0.39
CORGDP 3.57 6.31 3.64 6.45 1.59 3.66 2.71 4.38 1.57 4.37 2.96 3.20 1.83 4.57 4.02 5.52 4.26 3.04
VARGDPH -7.19 -4.77 -5.36 -3.22 -3.67 -3.55 -5.71 -3.35 -1.49 -1.88 -3.89 -2.62 -1.94 -1.86 -6.26 -2.01 -2.87 -1.42











Rho 0.93 44.90 0.83 24.68 0.84 23.74 0.82 16.82 0.84 19.51 0.88 20.07 0.86 29.78 0.92 31.45 0.89 22.34
Log-L -148.15 -161.73 -160.63 -151.13 -162.78 -150.73 -155.73 -119.88 -105.53
LogLNoRE -262.06 -262.02 -260.48 -246.33 -251.36 -246.58 -257.04 -204.09 -179.26
# obs. 564 564 564 562 559 538 554 441 404
# countries 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 45 44
% correct 0.73 0.73 0.71 0.74 0.72 0.74 0.72 0.73 0.71